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1. Abstract 
Although being very profitable in the past years, the contrarian strategy, that tries to 
exploit the reversion of the stock prices after an overreaction of the new available 
information, had decline in the past years. To boost the profitability of that specific 
strategy, I tried to divide the assets of Eurostoxx 600 by some firm specific factors. The 
results of such improvement were not clear, since the new strategy beat the benchmark 
in some periods, but none systematically achieved btter results in all the sample 
periods.  
Contrarian strategy; decline returns; improvements; trading costs.  
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2. Introduction 
The contrarian strategy was first introduced by Bond a d Thaler (1985), following the 
reasoning that people tend to overreact to unexpected information and drastic new 
events. This implies that if the stock prices overreact, they should reverse towards its 
real price when the overreaction forces cease to exist. In other words, if a stock price 
increases (decreases) drastically, compared to its peers, in some period, it must decline 
(increase) in the next, creating an opportunity to make gains by betting in the reverse 
strategy.  
Andrew and Khandani (2007) explore the effects of this strategy providing some 
evidences about the declining profitability of this strategy in recent years. In the matter 
of fact, in their study they found that since 1995 to 2007 the annualized Sharpe ratio 
(with a 0% risk free) declined from 53.87 to 2.79. This huge decline in profitability 
provides the idea that the strategy begins to be exhausted by its overexploitation.  
Since the strategy proved to be profitable in recent y ars, the question of making minor 
changes in the selection of stocks arises. With this in mind, the purpose of this work is 
to explore the impact of dividing the stocks by some statistical model to the profitability 
of the contrarian strategy. Although more than one factor can be used at each time, this 
work will focus only on the impact of using just one factor at each time. This should 
increase the diversification of the overall portfolio, enhancing the profitability of the 
contrarian strategy.  
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3. Literature Review 
The idea of overreaction on stock markets was proposed by Bondt and Thaler (1985), 
stating that “individuals tend to overweight recent information a d underweight prior 
(or base rate) data”1. They found that portfolios created with prior “losers” tend to 
outperform prior “winners”, with the losers gaining in average a 25% return higher than 
the winners. This concludes that the overreaction effect is asymmetric since the losers’ 
portfolio provide higher gains that the winners’ one. However they also find that the 
large positive returns of the loser portfolio occurred every January.  
As an extension of their prior study, Bondt and Thaler (1987) expand the understanding 
of returns of a contrarian strategy. In this new study they construct portfolios of the 50 
most extreme losers and with the 50 most extreme winners to find that in the following 
five-years test period the losers’ portfolio provides substantially higher gains than the 
winners’ ones. More interesting was to find that the overreaction effect cannot be 
attributed to changes in the CAPM betas, because the positive beta (0.220) of the 
arbitrage portfolio is not enough to explain the annual average returns of the strategy 
(9.2%).  
Lehmann (1988) in his study of market efficiency found strong evidence of market 
overreaction and reversion in short term intervals. Lehmann used short term periods in 
its strategy to avoid the predictability changes in expected returns due to changes in 
market fundamentals, constructing a costless portfolio in which he goes long in a 
portfolio of securities with negative returns in the previous week and go short in a 
portfolio with positive returns in the same time frame. His results suggested that 
“portfolios of securities that had positive returns in one week typically had negative 
                                                           
1 De Bondt, Werner F.M. and Richard Thaler. 1985. “Does the Stock Market Overreact?” The Journal of 
Finance, 40 (3): 793-805. 
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returns in the next week while those with negative returns in one week typically had 
positive returns in the next week”2.  
After the discussion that the contrarian strategy follows the reasoning of overreaction 
due to the fact that people tend to give more importance to the new information than the 
past one, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) provided a new insight about the reasoning of these 
abnormal returns provided by such strategy. In their paper, they state that the positive 
returns generated by the contrarian strategy were not strictly related to the overreaction 
of the prices to new information, but to some other explanations. By its reasoning, a 
contrarian strategy can provide positive returns even if the stock returns are not 
negatively correlated (a negative correlation implies the reversion of the abnormal 
swings in the prices to its fundamental values). Their study demonstrates that, if returns 
are positively cross autocorrelated, a contrarian strategy may yield positive returns even 
if the returns are serial independent. The overreaction of the stock market may enhance 
the profitability of such strategy but it is not necessary for such strategy to achieve 
positive returns. In fact, the empirical study showed that the importance of the 
overreaction to the expected returns of the contrarian strategy fall below the 50%, being 
the remaining due to the cross correlations among the stocks’ returns.  
In their attempt to explain the strong variation of stock returns in August 2007, Lo and 
Khandani (2007) also used a contrarian strategy in order to try to explain the mentioned 
variation. In their study, Lo and Khandani divided the stock assets by its market 
capitalization, and afterward applied the contrarian strategy in order to try to uncover 
the reasoning behind the extreme variations of the s ock prices in the middle August 
2007. However, the most interesting facts found in their work were regarded to the 
                                                           
2 Lehmann, Bruce. 1988. “Fads, Martingales, and Market Efficiency”. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper, 2533: 1-34. 
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decrease of the profitability of that kind of strategy. Indeed, since 1995, the average 
daily return of the contrarian strategy decline from 1.38% to 0.13% and the annualized 
sharpe ratio (with a 0% risk free) decline from 53.87 to 2.79. However, it should be kept 
in mind that the results obtained in 1995 reflect a rebalancing of a portfolio with 4,781 
assets on average which carries a substantial amount of trading costs. Another discovery 
was the fact that companies in the smallest deciles tended to provide higher average 
returns than the companies in the higher deciles in 1995, but these differences become 
almost neglected in 2007.  
Also following Lo and Khandani (2007), the number of hedge funds regarding Long-
Short strategies (in which the contrarian strategy belongs) had steadily increased, which 
combined with the declining profitability of the strategy leads to an increase of the 
leverage among the industry.  
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4. Data 
The stock prices were gathered from Bloomberg since the beginning of 2005 to the end 
of 2010, providing 6 years to test the hypothesis. However, two of the assets, out of a 
global of 260, did not presented data at all so I deci ed to exclude them from the 
calculations.  
The factors were also gathered from Bloomberg, but in this specific case data was 
gathered from the last trading day of 2004 to 2009 in order to compute the different 
groups without the problem of forward looking. The factors selected were Price 
Earnings (PE), Enterprise Value (EV), Enterprise Value to Book Value (EV to BV), 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings per Share (EPS). These factors were chosen from 
many of other firm specific factors due to the availability of data presented on 
Bloomberg. Many of other factors had missing data for too many assets or for too many 
years in each asset, which may bias the results of the strategy and harms the 
comparability of the results from one factor to another. Due to that limitation, only these 
five factors were selected in order to divide the stocks.  
 
  
8 
 
5. Methodology 
For the purpose, when we are comparing the different strategies, in the beginning we 
choose to ignore the transaction cost and other market frictions such price impacts, short 
sales and other institutional limitations. However, all these costs should be similar 
among all strategies, so for comparison we can ignore it. Later on, we will present the 
impact of the trading costs in the strategy because these can affect drastically the 
profitability of such strategy due to the daily rebalancing of the portfolio.  
To compare the different strategies’ profitability, we will use an approximation to the 
Sharpe ratio, in which we assume the risk free to be equal to zero, which, for 
convenience, it will be called Info Sharpe. We can ignore the risk free rate due to the 
fact that the strategy used in this work is a Long Short strategy that funds the long assets 
with the short ones avoiding the funding cost of the long only strategies.  
In this case the strategy was used with several stock  f the same index (Eurostoxx 
600). However, applying the strategy in such broad index can misplace the assets 
invested. For example, the banking system might suffer from some new information 
that makes its price fall. So, in this case, the strategy should buy all the banks presented 
in the index at that specific date, declining the diversification on the overall portfolio.  
Since the stocks of the same industry follows the same trend, to introduce 
diversification on the portfolio we can divide the entire index into different industries, 
and therefore applied the strategy in each industry individually. This development in the 
contrarian strategy provides a better diversification of the overall portfolio, because 
even if the banking industry is crashing, we will not be long in all the banks. Instead, we 
only buy one or two banks (the ones who take the sev ral decreases in price) and we 
will also be long in some assets in this industry (in this case that one who has the lower 
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decline of prices). This increase of diversification should improve the overall 
profitability of the portfolio leading to an increase of the Information Ratio. 
 However, this strategy became less appealing last years as stated by Lo and Khandani 
(2007), in which the risk adjusted return felt to 2.97 in 2007. Let’s just remember that 
when we do not incorporate the transaction costs in he calculations of the returns of the 
strategy, the returns presented are biased positively.  
Due to the degradation of the strategy profitability, new changes can and should be 
made in order to try to improve its results. Having this in mind, our next step will be 
divide the stocks presented in the Eurostoxx 600 related to different factors.  
We rebalance the stocks presented in each group annually because these values can 
change substantially from one year to another, and by oing this we avoid the situation 
in which the profitability of the strategy depends on the time at which we choose to 
divide the stocks.   
So, may approach was to divide all the 260 stocks into 13 different groups (20 assets per 
group), using a simply percentile division of the different factors. Moreover we must 
take in mind that not all groups always had 20 assets. As it has been explained early, 
some assets and some factors for specific stocks in specific years cannot be retrieved 
from Bloomberg, which may bias the results. However, since these differences were 
minimal, I chose to neglect that fact and used the available information to construct the 
different groups, ignoring the assets that do not present data for a specific period of 
time.  
Following the reasoning of Lehmann (1988) that used hort time intervals for the 
strategy to avoid changes in the fundamentals of the stock price, I chose to use a 
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contrarian strategy with only one day lag, buying the “yesterday” two losers and selling 
the two winners.  
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6. Results 
a. 1 day lag 
In order to test the profitability of the proposed strategies, first we need to define some 
benchmark to compare the results. The benchmark chosen for the purpose of this work 
was the contrarian strategy applied to stoxx600’s as ets divided into the different 
industry groups. I will always go short and long in the same number of assets in each 
group (in this case two long and two short assets pr group or industry) and I will 
applied the same methodology in terms of returns and Info Sharpes.  
In the first case, after dividing the assets into each group, I ranked the returns of the 
previous days and I will go long in the two assets with the lowest return and short the 
highest ones. The returns of such strategy are present d below: 
Return Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE 
2005 1.8% 1.7% 1.0% 0.2% 3.2% 3.0% 
2006 12.6% 13.0% 13.2% 11.2% 16.3% 14.2% 
2007 6.0% 7.2% -0.7% 7.5% 5.9% 0.7% 
2008 34.0% -4.4% -1.8% 3.6% 0.5% -1.1% 
2009 5.3% -1.2% 3.2% 9.8% 2.4% 0.7% 
2010 0.5% -8.7% -7.4% -2.3% -6.4% -4.5% 
Average 10.1% 1.2% 1.3% 5.0% 3.6% 2.2% 
 Table 1 – Returns of the contrarian strategy with one day lag 
As it can be observed from the table above, the contrarian strategy with only one day of 
lag, or buying the previous day loser and sell the previous day winner, does not provide 
outstanding results. In the matter of fact, only in 2006 (and 2008 for the benchmark 
strategy) it provided considerable returns. By the observation of this numbers, clearly 
the division of the assets by these different factors did not improve the profitability of 
the strategy and even deteriorate it. The average returns of the benchmark in all the 
analyzed period was 10.1%, which is clearly greater than the second best return, 5.0%.  
12 
 
However, analyzing only the return of the strategy should not be sufficient because we 
want to see if the strategy can improve the adjusted risk returns over the benchmark. 
The next table summarizes the Information Sharpe by all the strategies in the different 
years.  
Info Sharpe Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE 
2005 0.53 0.37 0.24 0.04 0.80 0.77 
2006 2.40 2.01 2.06 1.83 2.59 2.27 
2007 1.31 1.28 -0.11 1.39 1.03 0.12 
2008 3.58 -0.35 -0.14 0.31 0.04 -0.08 
2009 0.57 -0.11 0.29 0.97 0.22 0.06 
2010 0.09 -1.20 -1.02 -0.33 -0.94 -0.70 
 Table 2 – Info Sharpe of the contrarian strategy with one day lag 
The numbers provided show the decline of the strategy in 2009 and 2010, being 2008 an 
abnormal year due to the high volatility presented due to the financial crisis. However, 
none of the strategies provided better results than t e benchmark, providing some 
evidence that such division cannot improve the risk adjust profitability of the contrarian 
strategy.  
By this numbers, the strategy with only one day lag does not present outstanding results. 
In addition, the results presented did not incorporate trading costs, which may have a 
substantial effect due to the fact that such strategy r balances almost the whole portfolio 
every day. So, in a universe of 13 groups (that grows to 16 in the benchmark strategy) 
with two long and two short positions in each group, rebalancing the total portfolio may 
imply 52 trading per day (26 for closing the long positions and another 26 to closing the 
short ones). With such trades every day, the trading cost plays a significant role in the 
profitability of the strategy. To see this effect on the contrarian strategy is presented 
below the same strategies when applied a trading cost of 0.05% per transaction, which 
should be a reasonable value for institutional investors.  
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Return Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE 
2005 -12.6% -18.5% -19.3% -19.3% -16.7% -16.5% 
2006 -2.4% -7.4% -7.3% -8.5% -4.2% -5.7% 
2007 -8.7% -13.2% -20.8% -12.1% -14.1% -18.9% 
2008 19.1% -24.9% -22.1% -16.4% -19.8% -21.1% 
2009 -9.5% -21.5% -17.0% -10.1% -17.7% -18.8% 
2010 -14.4% -28.9% -27.5% -21.9% -26.1% -24.2% 
Average -4.8% -19.1% -19.0% -14.7% -16.4% -17.5% 
 Table 3 – Returns of the contrarian strategy with 0.05% of trading costs. 
Info Sharpe Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE 
2005 -3.60 -4.11 -4.44 -4.30 -4.17 -4.17 
2006 -0.45 -1.13 -1.12 -1.36 -0.66 -0.89 
2007 -1.91 -2.35 -3.46 -2.24 -2.44 -3.42 
2008 2.01 -1.94 -1.71 -1.39 -1.61 -1.67 
2009 -1.01 -1.95 -1.53 -0.99 -1.63 -1.74 
2010 -2.35 -4.00 -3.78 -3.18 -3.84 -3.71 
 Table 4 – Info Sharpe of the contrarian strategy with 0.05% of trading costs. 
The impact of the trading costs in the strategy is tremendous. Only the year of 2008 to 
the Benchmark strategy presented a positive return, and consequently a positive 
Information Sharpe. All other strategies presented always negative returns, which mean 
that the transaction costs overcome all the possible gains of such strategies. Also, it can 
be seen the effect of the trading cost in the return of this strategy, because the average 
returns moved from 1.2% in the EPS to -19.1%, which implies a decline of more than 
20% only due to trading costs.  
 
b. 5 day lag 
The results presented earlier stated that we cannot improve the strategy by dividing the 
assets by different factors instead of dividing it by industry groups. However, even the 
benchmark strategy did not provided outstanding results, at least when compared to the 
results founded in the literature. So, instead of only focus in the “yesterday” returns, 
now I will look for the weekly returns in order to see which asset is overreacting in 
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relation to the others. The strategy continued to be implemented in a daily basis, being 
the weekly returns calculated by a rolling average of 5 trading days. The results 
presented under the denomination of “All” correspond to invest in all the factor’s 
strategies studied. Although it should not provide better returns, using all the strategies 
may smooth these returns, diminishing the standard eviation and improving the Info 
Sharpe. The returns of this modified strategy are presented below:  
Return Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 5.7% 16.4% 14.7% 13.5% 18.5% 16.4% 15.9% 
2006 7.6% 12.3% 13.4% 13.2% 7.7% 13.9% 12.1% 
2007 8.0% 15.6% 9.0% 10.3% 8.9% 9.4% 10.6% 
2008 41.3% 30.6% 30.6% 30.7% 33.9% 34.0% 32.0% 
2009 10.1% 8.4% 6.6% 17.8% 23.1% 14.0% 14.0% 
2010 5.7% 7.2% 10.5% 8.7% 2.6% 12.9% 8.4% 
Average 13.1% 15.1% 14.2% 15.7% 15.8% 16.8% 15.5% 
 Table 5 – Returns of the contrarian strategy using a 5 day moving average to rank the stocks 
The main conclusion that arose from the observation of these results is that using 
weekly returns to rank the stocks instead of using o ly the past day returns provide a 
better profitability for the contrarian strategy. In fact, the average return on the 
benchmark increased from the previous 10.1% to 13.1%, and the increase in the factors 
are even greater. For example, when dividing by EPS, the average return rose from the 
previous 1.2% to 15.1% only by using the 5 days average. It should be noted that the 
improvement on the factors’ strategies were much greater than the observed in the 
benchmark, although I did not find any reasoning for this.  
In this case, the returns of the strategy dividing the assets by some factor are often 
higher than the benchmark, being 2008 the only yearwhere the benchmark reached a 
higher profitability than all the “factors”.  
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Info Sharpe Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 1.69 3.44 3.66 2.54 4.67 3.33 3.86 
2006 1.79 1.99 2.28 2.00 1.14 2.30 2.02 
2007 1.64 2.30 1.30 1.60 1.24 1.36 1.64 
2008 4.53 1.97 2.03 1.99 2.27 2.17 2.15 
2009 1.10 0.63 0.54 1.55 1.97 1.09 1.18 
2010 0.97 0.84 1.33 1.05 0.32 1.51 1.05 
 Table 6 – Info Sharpe of the contrarian strategy using a 5 day moving average to rank the stocks 
In terms of Info Sharpe, the results are quite similar to the returns. This measure is 
substantially higher than when we only use the previous day return to rank the stocks 
and in this case, some of the factors beat the benchmark. However, there was not a 
single one that beat always the benchmark, because the Info Sharpe for the benchmark 
in 2008 is one of the highest achieved in all the tests. This reflects the reasoning that the 
benchmark strategy provided outstanding results in downturn periods, or period in 
which the volatility peak high. All the other strategies gather some of this effect too, but 
none of them delivered such high Info Sharpe than te benchmark.  
If we ignore the year of 2008, has been almost an anom ly, it can be seen that almost all 
the strategies decline its risk adjusted return in the recent years. The strategy that had 
the higher decrease in risk adjusted return was when w  used the PE to divide the 
stocks.  
Another important issue at which we should look when comparing strategies is the 
percentage of positive months. For the calculation of the percentage of positive months 
I used a rolling average of 22 days as being the average return of a moth comprehended 
in that window of days. Afterward it was just dividing the positive returns by the total 
amount of observations in that year. The results for the strategies without transaction 
costs are presented below: 
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% positive months Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 61% 89% 86% 74% 96% 80% 87% 
2006 59% 88% 91% 90% 85% 93% 90% 
2007 59% 79% 64% 65% 60% 71% 67% 
2008 93% 81% 78% 81% 83% 87% 83% 
2009 53% 57% 58% 67% 79% 60% 66% 
2010 53% 68% 72% 69% 58% 72% 70% 
Table 7 – Percentage of positive months in the contrarian strategy 
As it can be observed, excluding 2008, all the strategies beat the benchmark in this 
specific parameter. The benchmark presents a percentage of positive monthly returns in 
the area of the 50% (excepting for the 93% obtained  2008), and the factor presented a 
percentage of positive monthly returns that range from 55% to almost 95%.  
 
i. Transaction costs 
As stated before, the transaction costs have a tremendous impact in the profitability of 
the contrarian strategy, due to the factors discussed before. Next tables show us the 
impact on the returns of 0.02% and 0.05% trading cost on these strategies: 
Return Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 2.4% 11.4% 9.8% 8.6% 13.5% 11.4% 11.0% 
2006 4.2% 7.8% 9.0% 8.7% 3.3% 9.3% 7.6% 
2007 4.7% 11.1% 4.6% 5.8% 4.5% 5.0% 6.2% 
2008 37.9% 26.0% 26.1% 26.0% 29.4% 29.5% 27.4% 
2009 6.8% 3.9% 2.1% 13.3% 18.6% 9.5% 9.5% 
2010 2.4% 2.8% 6.1% 4.3% -1.6% 8.3% 4.0% 
Average 9.7% 10.5% 9.6% 11.1% 11.3% 12.2% 10.9% 
 Table 8 – Returns of the contrarian strategy with 0.02% of trading costs. 
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Return Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 -2.5% 4.0% 2.4% 1.1% 6.1% 4.0% 3.5% 
2006 -0.8% 1.1% 2.2% 2.0% -3.3% 2.5% 0.9% 
2007 -0.2% 4.3% -2.0% -0.9% -2.0% -1.7% -0.5% 
2008 32.8% 19.2% 19.3% 19.1% 22.6% 22.7% 20.6% 
2009 1.7% -2.8% -4.6% 6.5% 11.8% 2.6% 2.7% 
2010 -2.5% -3.7% -0.5% -2.4% -8.1% 1.6% -2.6% 
Average 4.7% 3.7% 2.8% 4.2% 4.5% 5.3% 4.1% 
 Table 9 – Returns of the contrarian strategy with 0.05% of trading costs. 
As in the previous case, here the transaction costs continue to play a vital role in the 
profitability of the strategies. A simple 0.02% of transactions costs diminish the average 
profitability of the strategies in about 300b.p. in the benchmark case and 500b.p. in all 
the other cases. And when we increase the transaction osts to 0.05% these differences 
increase to 800b.p. to the benchmark and 1100b.p. to the other strategies. So when 
applying such strategy we must always take into account the level of transaction costs, 
because even with a 0.05% of transactions costs, the returns of the strategy become 
negative in some periods.  
The only strategy that manages to deliver better avage return (in the case of 0.05% of 
transaction costs) than the benchmark was the strategy employing ROE, which achieved 
an average return of 5.3%. However, it should be not d that the highest average gains 
were almost exclusively obtained in 2008. Without the contribution of that year, it 
seems like it was an abnormal return compared to the o er periods, the benchmark and 
the EV strategies should present negative average returns, being ROE the one which 
presented the highest one (1.8%).  
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Info Sharpe Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 0.71 2.39 2.43 1.61 3.42 2.32 2.65 
2006 1.00 1.27 1.52 1.32 0.49 1.55 1.27 
2007 0.97 1.63 0.67 0.90 0.63 0.72 0.96 
2008 4.15 1.68 1.73 1.69 1.96 1.88 1.84 
2009 0.73 0.29 0.17 1.15 1.59 0.73 0.80 
2010 0.41 0.33 0.78 0.51 -0.20 0.98 0.50 
 Table 10 – Info Sharpe of the contrarian strategy with 0.02% of trading costs. 
Info Sharpe Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 -0.75 0.83 0.59 0.22 1.53 0.80 0.85 
2006 -0.20 0.18 0.38 0.30 -0.48 0.42 0.15 
2007 -0.04 0.63 -0.29 -0.14 -0.28 -0.25 -0.07 
2008 3.58 1.24 1.28 1.24 1.51 1.45 1.38 
2009 0.19 -0.21 -0.38 0.56 1.01 0.20 0.23 
2010 -0.43 -0.43 -0.06 -0.29 -0.97 0.18 -0.33 
 Table 11 – Info Sharpe of the contrarian strategy with 0.05% of trading costs. 
When we compare the Info sharp of the strategies, it also can be seen that it decreases as 
long as the transaction cost increased. Although a 0.02% of transaction costs provides 
often positive Info sharpes, when we increase that value to 0.05% the strategies decline 
sharply it risk adjusted return. If we ignore the year of 2008, we only found Info sharpes 
superior to one in two other situations, when we divide the stocks by their PE. However, 
in the last year that strategy provided poor results, which indicates some signs of 
variability of the returns.  
% positive months Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 51% 86% 74% 69% 90% 73% 75% 
2006 48% 77% 82% 83% 72% 85% 83% 
2007 54% 70% 54% 54% 57% 59% 59% 
2008 91% 73% 75% 77% 75% 83% 78% 
2009 45% 52% 56% 63% 68% 56% 60% 
2010 45% 60% 69% 60% 48% 65% 64% 
 Table 12 – Percentage of positive months in the contrarian strategy with 0.02% of trading costs 
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% positive months Benchmark EPS EV EV to BV PE ROE All 
2005 38% 69% 58% 59% 74% 67% 68% 
2006 35% 61% 59% 60% 44% 59% 53% 
2007 42% 59% 40% 41% 47% 41% 44% 
2008 85% 65% 66% 69% 67% 74% 70% 
2009 37% 44% 46% 56% 61% 52% 51% 
2010 37% 46% 58% 49% 40% 49% 46% 
 Table 13 – Percentage of positive months in the contrarian strategy with 0.05% of trading costs 
A 0.02% of trading costs did not change substantially the percentage of positive months, 
with the differences ranging from 400b.p. to 1100b.p. However, when we increase the 
trading cost to 0.05%, this measure changes significa tly, especially for the benchmark, 
in which does not provide positive month returns superior to 50%, excluding 2008.  
In the next graphic, it is possible to see the cumulative returns of the strategies, with the 
0.05% of trading costs: 
 
Graphic 1 – Cumulative returns of the contrarian strategy with 0.05% of trading costs 
It was not very surprisingly that the cumulative retu ns of the benchmark strategy were 
negative until the beginning of 2008. All the other strategies overcome the benchmark 
until the biggest crash of the financial crisis of 2008. In fact, the huge boost of the 
returns of all the strategies coincide with the crash occurred in the third quarter of 2008 
after the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothe s. It also can be noticed that in the 
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last semester of 2010, all strategies showed a negativ  trend. Moreover, it can be seen 
that the patterns of the returns under the different approaches did not differ significantly.   
 
c. Limitations 
The first thing that we always should keep in mind is that this was a study in historical 
data which may not reflect what will happen in future.  
The results state that it may be possible to improve the contrarian strategy to achieved 
better gains than its benchmark. However, the study period encounters one of the 
biggest financial crises, which pushed down the stock markets all over the world. 
Nevertheless, that was the year in which the strategy provided the biggest risk adjusted 
strategy, which pushed upwards the overall profitabil y of such strategy. This increase 
may be derived to the high volatility of the period r even to the overreaction of the 
people subsequent to the market crash. The overreaction idea fits better in the available 
theory, but in this work we did not extend that line of thought. For comparison reasons, 
this effect should affect all the approaches equally which should not affect the overall 
conclusions. 
These tests presented some degree of survivorship bias due to the fact that the assets 
used were the ones available in the Eurostoxx 600 in 2010. However, this does not 
mean that all the assets were already at the index in previous years. This can bias the 
results because the assets presented in the index i 2010 are the ones that survive until 
that date. However, since the index change, the stock  used should change too, but for 
simplicity I chose to avoid this issue due to the fact that it should not change very much 
the results. 
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The benchmark and the approaches followed had a different number of groups (16 to 
the benchmark and 13 to the other approaches).This means that overall, the benchmark 
has more long and short positions than the other app o ches. I did not approach this 
problem, but the number of groups may affect the ovrall result, at least due to the 
transaction costs. More research in this area may be done to see the effects of different 
number of groups leading to a different number of assets in each group. Another 
difference remains to the number of assets in each group. In my approach I tried to 
construct groups with the same number of assets in each one and in the benchmark, the 
number of assets in each group varies from 8 in the smallest to 29 in the biggest one.  
The data available was not always the best. As stated before, two of the assets did not 
presented data at all, and when searching for factors, many did not have data available 
to all the stocks in all the years. That restrained substantially the available factors that 
can be used without losing a lot of the stocks due to the unavailability of the data. 
However, I also did not search for all the available factors presented in the market 
which may change the conclusions obtained in this work.  
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7. Conclusion 
The contrarian strategy is commonly used in the hedge funds industry. However, in the 
recent years, its profitability declines due to thehigher competitiveness of the industry. 
Consequently improvements are needed in order to try to boost the returns of such 
strategy.  
After dividing the Eurostxx 600 assets into industry g oups and reached the conclusion 
that the contrarian strategy loss its returns last years, the next step was try to find new 
systematically ways to divide these stocks in order to increase the diversification of the 
portfolios of the strategy. This report tried different firm specific factors to divide the 
assets into different groups, but the results were unclear.  
Using only the returns of the previous day to find the stocks in overreaction, lead to 
very negative returns, especially after applying the transactions costs. These costs play a 
very important role in this strategy because they rbalance the overall portfolio in a 
daily basis.  
Using weekly returns, instead of the past day returns, enhances the profitability of the 
strategy, presenting some positive risk adjusted returns. However, almost all of those 
positive returns appear only in late 2008 and the beginning of 2009 which coincided 
with financial crises, leading to the conclusion that such strategy may had a counter 
cyclical nature.  
The transaction costs represent a key factor to the profitability of such strategies. In 
overall, the presence of 0.05% of transaction cost decreased the yearly returns of the 
strategy in almost 1000b.p., which may lead to negative returns. Consequently, this 
strategy should only be pursued by some institutional investor that can access to lower 
transaction costs by investing larger sums of capital. It should be taken in account that if 
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the overall transaction costs raise above the 0.05% this strategy may become 
unprofitable. 
Investing in all the strategies smooth its risk adjusted profitability, often delivering 
higher risk adjusted returns than the benchmark, failing only in 2008. However, the 
gains of using this type of strategy are not fantastic, and using a multivariate process to 
mix the assets, trying to increase its cross sectional relationships, as stated in Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990), can provide better results. However, there are a lot of multivariate 
processes to group the stocks, each one with its specifications. Due to that fact, this 
work did not address that thematic, being a subject to further research.  
In the weekly return case, some of the risk adjusted returns found under the division of 
stock by the factors were higher than the benchmark, especially in the results obtained 
by ROE and EV to BV that only provides worst result in 2007 and 2008. However, 
since none of the factors overcome the benchmark in all the analyzed periods, we 
cannot conclude about the gains of using such division instead of the division into 
industries. Comparing the different factors used, none systematically presented results 
above the other, in all the sample analyzed, being, however, the ROE the one which 
consistently provided better results at least in the last years. This work only focused on 
a very specific case, in which I used 13 different groups and five different factors to 
divide the stocks into one of each group. The number of groups chosen and the factors 
used may influence the outcome of the strategy but this will demand more research to 
provide a more incisive conclusion.  
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